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ADEA DOCTRINAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE FULFILLMENT
OF THE WIRTZ REPORT AGENDA
Michael C. Harper*
Ideally, this symposium marking the three-decade anniversary of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) would
present an opportunity to assess how well the ADEA has
achieved its plausible goals. However, I recognize that any
definitive assessment of the success of a statute like the ADEA,
which requires the modification of the behavior of social actors,
must depend on the kind of sophisticated empirical study for
which I have neither the time, resources or capability. I also
recognize that defending my identification of the goals of the
ADEA might itself require an entire essay.
Therefore, I will present a more modest project, albeit one
that reflects the characteristic hubris of law professors. I will
take as given the ultimate goals set for national legislation on
age discrimination in employment by the Congressionally directed report that is commonly, viewed as leading to the passage of
the ADEA, generally cited as the Wirtz Report after Secretary
of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, under whose signature it was issued.' I will then argue that our ability to achieve these ultimate goals through the ADEA, as interpreted and applied by
the courts, is sharply limited. Fulfilling the agenda of the Wirtz
Report for age discrimination legislation would require a major
transformation of the operation of the ADEA, a transformation
whose costs our society may not be willing to pay.
After a brief review of the Wirtz Report and the ambitions it
set for age discrimination legislation, I will focus on two sets of

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I wish to thank my current research assistant, Sandra K Davis, for her capable assistance.
1. See W. WILLARD WIRTZ, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER:
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYmENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965), reprinted in
EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACTS
(1981) [hereinafter WimT REPORT].
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developments in the judicial interpretation of the ADEA. First,
I will consider how the courts have addressed, or rather failed
to address, the difficulty in proving whether the agents of an
employer have covertly taken age into account in making an
employment decision. Second, I will consider the implications of
the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins2

for the capacity of the ADEA to fulfill the potential of an age
discrimination law to remove the institutional barriers to the
employment of older Americans.
I. THE AGENDA OF THE WIRTZ REPORT

Responding to the direction of Congress to study and report
on "factors which might result in discrimination in employment
because of age and of the consequences of such discrimination
on the economy and individuals affected," the Wirtz Report
considered what it viewed as four types of discrimination which
might result in the unemployment or underemployment of older
workers? The Report found no significant presence of the first
of these categories, discrimination based on dislike or intolerant
feelings about older workers unrelated to their ability to do
work.4 The Report thereby contrasted the problem of age discrimination in employment with the race and other employment
discrimination problems that Congress had already attempted
to address in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Report, however, did find a pervasive presence of a second form of age discrimination in employment, the setting of
age limits beyond which employers will not consider workers for
job openings. The Report considered such limitations to be
based on general assumptions about the ability of older workers
to perform effectively, "without consideration of a particular
applicant's individual qualifications."' Having rejected dislike
and intolerance as an explanation for these assumptions, the
Report did not draw definitive conclusions about the actual
explanations. Nonetheless, it did note a number of explanations
2. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
3. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 §
715, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1994)).
4. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 5-6.

5. See id. at 6.
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given by employers, including their ability to hire most younger
workers for less money and the limited work expectancy of
older workers relative to their training costs.6 The Report also
concluded that there was strong reason to believe that the
assumptions were arbitrary in most cases, both because of evidence that the average work performance of older workers in a
broad range of jobs is at least equal to that of younger workers,
and also. because of the willingness of many employers to consider and hire older workers on their individual merits.'
The Report's analysis of this second form of age discrimination in employment implicitly described what economists have
termed "statistical discrimination," the rejection of all members
of a status group because of certain characteristics of a large
proportion of the group relative to those outside the group.
Statistical discrimination on the basis of age, especially at the
hiring stage highlighted by the Wirtz Report,9 might be economically rational for employers for several reasons.
First, the process of assessing individual applicants for employment can be very expensive. At least in a relatively loose
labor market, it may be efficient for employers to screen workers on the basis of easily identifiable characteristics, such as
age, which have some correlation with future productivity relative to cost before making individual assessments. This may be
true even where many workers in the excluded class would
perform at an above-average level.
Second, as suggested by employers' stated concern with the
limited future work expectancy of older workers and training
costs, employers may want to exclude all older workers from
consideration for new jobs because of the likely average future
tenure of an older worker relative to the average future tenure
of a younger worker. This motivation may be economically rational because of normal retirement and life cycle patterns, and
because, as acknowledged in the Wirtz Report, at some age

6. See id. at 8.
7. See id. at 8-9.
8. See, e.g., Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62
AmI. ECON. REV. 659 (1972).
9. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
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level work efficiency will decline in most jobs.' ° Note, however,
that many older workers excluded by such rational generalizations might have worked longer in the jobs from which they
were excluded than many of the younger workers that were at
least given individual consideration for these jobs.
Third, as is suggested by the employers' stated concern with
the higher wage expectations of older workers, employers may
believe that the average older worker will impose greater labor
costs on their business than would an average younger worker
of equal productivity. As will be explained below," such beliefs
about the higher wage expectations of older workers are supported both by empirical studies and plausible economic theories. These studies and theories also suggest that employers
may not be able adequately to assuage any concerns about the
higher wage expectations of older workers by setting an entry
level wage, regardless of age, for all applicants for a particular
job. Workers whose wage expectations are frustrated may have
lower morale and perform at a lower percentage of their capacity. Again, however, the result of employers' rational beliefs
about the effects of the higher wage expectations of older workers may be the exclusion of the consideration of all older workers for particular jobs, regardless of the willingness of many of
these workers to fill these jobs at the same pay as younger
workers.
This theory of economically rational statistical discrimination
explains why the Wirtz Report found that arbitrary age limits
on hiring were pervasive in the American economy at the time,
even in the absence of age-based intolerance and animus. It
also justifies the Report's concern with these age limits, given
the Congressional charge to address consequences of age discrimination to the American economy and directly affected individuals. For even if economically rational for individual employers, arbitrary age-based generalizations may be harmful to the
aggregate economy if they result in the forced retirement, unemployment, and underemployment of many potentially productive older Americans, as well as the aggravation of the burden
of public support for the elderly. Furthermore, to the extent

10. See id. at 9.
11. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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that age-based generalizations result in the loss of employment
opportunities that many older workers could in fact fufill, they
result in the unnecessary denial to these workers of that which
can best provide dignity to most of us: meaningful and productive work. The Wirtz Report, thus, understandably focused on
employers' age-based generalizations, whatever their economic
rationale, as the prime evidence of what it found to be "the
Nation's waste...
of a wealth of human resources ... and
the needless denial ...
of opportunity for that useful activity

which constitutes much of life's meaning."'
Concern with effects on the national economy and on unemployed and underemployed older workers also underlies the
Report's consideration of the other two categories of discrimination that it identifies. In both of these categories the Report
gives examples of employment practices that treat employees or
applicants for employment on the basis of some factor other
than age, but that have the effect of making it more difficult
for older workers to be hired or to remain employed. In the
first of these last two categories, the Report considers a number
of ostensibly neutral factors, including health, educational attainment, adaptation to new technology, and aptitude testing,
which may impede the employment of older workers. In the
final category, the Report considers other "institutional arrangements" which are "designed to protect the employment of older
workers while they remain in the work force, and to provide
support when they leave it or are ill."' Some of these arrangements, including promotion-from-within policies and departmental, rather than employer-wide, seniority, while formally neutral
with respect to age, may affect older workers disproportionately.
Others, such as private pension and health insurance plans,
may provide employers, concerned with the higher costs of the

12. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. The Report estimated that "a million manyears of productive time are unused each year because of unemployment of workers
over age 45; and vastly greater numbers are lost because of forced, compulsory, or
automatic retirement." Id. at 18. It also estimated that the nation's economy loses
"several billion dollars" each year because of involuntary retirement. See id. The Report further concluded that the "consequences of discrimination on the individuals
affected ...
show up in widespread uncertainty concerning the role of vigorous older
persons in our society, and in personal frustrations and anxieties." Id. at 19.
13. Id. at 2, 15-17.
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provision of such plans to an older workforce, further economic
incentives for age-based hiring and terminations.
The Report does not recommend that all the practices it lists
in the last two categories be condemned by an age discrimination law. Indeed, it treats the factors in the third category as
often demonstrating "a relationship" between age and ability to
perform a job.'4 However, the Report's discussion of these factors demonstrates a recognition that addressing the aggregate
economic and personal impact of the unemployment and underemployment of older workers will require more than the elimination of overt age-based hiring limits. Not surprisingly, the
Report recommends not only action to eliminate arbitrary age
discrimination in employment, but also action to adjust institutional arrangements which work to the disadvantage of older
workers. 5
As stated above, the Wirtz Report provided the initiative for
Congressional passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The goals that the Report identified for age
discrimination legislation, the reduction of wasted human resources in the involuntary unemployment and underemployment
of older American workers and the enhancement of human
dignity for older Americans, were reflected in Congressional
statements in support of the Act' and in the Act's statement
of findings and purpose.'
But can the ADEA, as drafted and interpreted by the courts,
fulfill the Report's agenda for an age discrimination law-the
assurance that employment opportunities not be denied older
workers, based on unfair or arbitrary, rather than productivityrelated considerations? Unfortunately, a review of the ADEA's
interpretation and application over the last three decades must
yield a negative answer to this question. In my view, the Act
fails to provide that which an anti-discrimination regulatory
statute would have to provide to achieve the Wirtz Report's
14. See id. at 2.
15. See id. at 21-22. Admittedly, however, the Report does not consider how an
anti-discrimination law might address the institutional barriers to the employment of
older workers that the Report identifies.
16. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 90-723, at 4 (1967) (setting forth views of leading ADEA
sponsor Senator Javits); 113 CONG. REc. 34,742 (1967) (statement of Rep. Matsunaga).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
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ultimate goals of maximum use of the potential of older Americans and the maintenance of their dignity as workers.
I1. PROVING DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

The ADEA undoubtedly has eradicated the formal upper age
limits on hiring upon which the Wirtz Report first focused.'8
Older workers no longer are advised by advertisements and
other recruitment literature not to apply for open positions.
They no longer are told that they cannot be hired because of
their age. Such practices of course are condemned by the Act,'
they can be readily demonstrated in court, and their proof renders discriminating employers liable not only for the wages the
older workers would have earned, but also an additional equal
amount as "liquidated damages."20
Moreover, after several amendments, the ADEA also now has
eliminated at least formal age-based mandatory retirement. The
Supreme Court interpreted the ADEA as originally enacted to
permit mandatory retirement provisions in bona fide employee
retirement plans.2 ' Within a year, however, Congress reacted
to what it apparently viewed as the Court's distortion of its
intent by clarifying that "no employee benefit plan shall require
or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual" protected by the Act," and in 1986 removed the remaining seventyyear-old cap on the class of forty-year-old and older workers
protected by the statute.'

18. See WERTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (1994). Section 216 is incorporated into the ADEA
from the Fair Labor Standards Act. The proviso to section 626(b) states that under
the ADEA, "liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations."
The Supreme Court has twice held that establishing a "willful" violation requires
proof that the defendant acted in knowing or reckless disregard of the ADEA See
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 614 (1993); Trans World Airlines v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1985). A demonstration of a formal age cap on hiring
presumably establishes such willfulness.
21. See United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
22. PUB. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
23. See Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)
(1994)). The ADEA's original age sixty-five-year-old cap was first raised to age seventy in 1978. Pub. L. 95-256, §3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
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However, the ADEA's prohibition of overt age-based forced
discharges of incumbent workers remains much less effective
than its prohibition of overt age-based hiring policies, because
the Act has been interpreted to allow employers to remove
older workers who would prefer continued employment by inducing their resignation through a combination of threats and
special early retirement benefits. As I have explained in an
earlier article," the 1990 amendments to the ADEA in the
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA)25 seem to confirm circuit court decisions that allow employers to use threats,
as well as bribes, to induce resignation from particular workers
identified by age, as long as the threats alone do not make the
workers' position so intolerable as to constitute constructive discharge.26 Indeed, a post-OWBPA Fourth Circuit decision even
held that an employee was not constructively discharged when
told that his position would be eliminated by the end of the
calendar year if he did not resign and take some extra benefits
by July 1.27 Although this particular decision seems to misapply the constructive discharge approach accepted by the
OWBPA, since the employee was directly told that he did not
have the option of continuing to work in his old position, 8 the
legislative history of the OWBPA makes clear that Congress
intended to permit employers to encourage older employees to
accept early retirement offers by stressing the prospect of being
laid off for other than age-based reasons.' This indulgence of
schemes to remove older workers from jobs in which they would

24. See Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act,
79 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1321 (1993).
25. Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 621 (1994)).
26. The leading case is Henn v. National Geographic Society, 819 F.2d 824 (7th
Cir. 1987). Cf. Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 865 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1987) modified, 884
F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is relevant to the determination of voluntariness [of
acceptance of early retirement] whether the employees received sufficient time to
make a decision"); see also, e.g., EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 925 F.2d 619, 634
(3d Cir. 1991); Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276, 277 (1st Cir. 1988); Bodnar v.
Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1988).
27. See Blistein v. St. John's College, 74 F.3d 1459, 1463, 1468-69 (4th Cir. 1996).
28. See id. at 1463. Other post-OWBPA decisions have not been as indulgent of
such employer tactics. See Kalvinskas v. California Inst. of Tech., 96 F.3d 1305, 1308
(9th Cir. 1996); Smith v. World Ins., 38 F.3d 1456, 1461 (8th Cir. 1994).
29. See Harper, supra note 24, at 1309-21.
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prefer to continue to work significantly compromises the capacity of the ADEA to avert the human costs of unnecessary unemployment, underemployment, and loss of dignity for older Americans.
Yet the ADEA could still at least effectively address what the
Wirtz Report identified as the primary cause of these human
costs, the infection of American personnel decision-making with
generalized assumptions about the future productivity of older
workers, if it could prevent such decision-making being covertly
tainted by such assumptions, as well as being overtly and formally based on age. Early retirement incentives do not provide
an alternative method to avoid hiring older workers, and they
will often prove too expensive a tool for the removal of many
older workers. However, there is little reason to believe that
the ADEA as currently interpreted can substantially eliminate
covert, as well as overt, age discrimination.
I base this last conclusion on two reasonable factual assumptions and on an analysis of the doctrine developed by the courts
to define how plaintiffs must prove covert age discrimination.
The first assumption is that employers often confront significant economic incentives to evade the commands of the ADEA
by considering age in personnel decision-making. As explained
above, 0 age-based stereotypes often have enough basis in
truth to be economically efficient to apply. Especially when
making hiring decisions, employers rationally may use age to
predict future productivity and job tenure. Employers may also
rationally want to consider age when deciding on promotions to
new jobs, at least where the costs of training are less likely to
be recouped for older workers. Employers may also have rational concerns about the age balance of their workforce;3 they
do not want most of their workers to retire within a small time
period and thus make retraining more difficult. This concern
provides incentives to consider age when determining who will
be laid off in a reduction-in-force.

30. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
31. See generally H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 6-7 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C-A.N. 2213, 2219-20 (recognizing that employers may have good reason to
want to maintain an age balance in their workforce).
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My second assumption is that it is very difficult to prove the
covert consideration of age in personnel decision-making. Covert
motivation is generally difficult to establish, especially where
the law provides incentives to decision-makers to avoid making
their full motivations manifest. Decisions on whether to hire or
retain employees usually require the consideration of numerous
factors, and the record of some of these factors, such as work
evaluations and the subjective standards of management decision-makers, are within the control of employers. We can assume that employers and their counsel have become more and
more sophisticated in constructing justifications ex ante, as well
as ex post, for potentially challengeable adverse employment
decisions. In many cases these justifications may not completely
eclipse evidence that firm decision-makers are influenced by
considerations of age, but the explanations may still be too
plausible to be totally discounted. Applicants for employment
who have not been within the firm, and, therefore, have no
access to information about its decision-making processes and
the comparative treatment of other workers presumably are
especially vulnerable to the construction of plausible, pretextual
reasons for their failure to secure a desired position.
I therefore conclude that in order for the ADEA to substantially eliminate the covert consideration of age in employment
decision-making, plaintiffs must have the benefit of doctrine
that enables them to counteract employer evasion. First, given
the unlikelihood that sophisticated managers will in any way
directly acknowledge considering a worker's age, such doctrine
must assist plaintiffs proving the existence of covert consideration of age indirectly by proof that an employer's justifications
are at least not fully credible. Second, and probably more importantly, given employers' control over personnel records and
their consequent ability to fashion plausible justifications for
personnel decisions, the doctrine must also enable plaintiffs to
impose a deterrent penalty on employers by proving that age
played some role in an employment decision, regardless of
whether the plaintiffs can prove that age determined or caused
the decision.
Doctrine developed by the courts under the ADEA now offers
plaintiffs neither of these advantages. Plaintiffs seemed to be
offered the first kind of assistance by the Supreme Court's
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initial development, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,"
3
of
and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,s

an indirect disparate treatment methodology of proof for Title
VII cases. By presenting a relatively easy prima facie case,'
plaintiffs could compel an employer-defendant to articulate a
nondiscriminatory justification for a challenged personnel action. Moreover, the Court seemed to suggest that a plaintiff
who proved that the defendant's articulated justification was
pretextual would also prove a violation of Title VIrs proscription of certain kinds of discriminatory motivations. In Burdine,
the Court explained that the plaintiffs ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of discriminatory motivation merges
with proving "that the proffered reason was not the true reason
for the employment decision. " ' Plaintiffs may succeed, said
the Court, "either directly by persuading ...

that a discrimi-

natory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly.
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 6
After some initial resistance,37 the McDonnell DouglasBurdine methodology of proof was applied by the circuit courts
to the ADEA.' The Supreme Court has also assumed its applicability.39 Furthermore, at least at one time, it promised to
be even more valuable to ADEA plaintiffs than to Title VII

32. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
33. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

34. The first formulation of a plaintiffs prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas
was: "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
35. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Laugeson v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (dictum).
38. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546 (4th

Cir. 1995), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996); Roper v.
Peabody Coal Co., 47 F.3d 925, 926-27 (7th Cir. 1995); Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987
F.2d 324, 326 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 856-57 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1981); Loeb. v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014-16 (1st Cir. 1979).
39. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1309
(1996); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993) (citing McDonnell Douglas as "creating proof framework applicable to ADEA").
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plaintiffs because jury trials have been available in age discrimination cases since 1978,4 while they have been offered in Title VII litigation only since the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.41 Inasmuch as the credibility of an employer's agent
in articulating a nondiscriminatory justification would seem to
present a question of fact, McDonnell Douglas-Burdine could be
read to guarantee ADEA plaintiffs who could satisfy a light
prima facie burden jury consideration of their claims. Moreover,
whatever the worth of jury trials to race and other Title VII
plaintiffs, it seems clear that the average juror will be more
sympathetic to a disadvantaged older worker than will privileged, tenured members of the elite federal judiciary.4 2

Despite this, any promise of special assistance in the proof of
covert motivation that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine offered to
ADEA plaintiffs, as well as Title VII plaintiffs, has been shattered. First, most circuit courts have not accepted proof of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case and a questioning of the
veracity of the employer's proffered justification as adequate for
a jury to find age discrimination motivation; they require some
additional proof that the justification was pretextual.' Second,
despite the language from Burdine quoted above, a number of
circuit courts held that plaintiffs could not establish liability
under the McDonnell Douglas methodology by proving that the
defendant's justification was pretextual without proving that it
was a pretext for a discriminatory motive." In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Supreme Court confirmed this second
line of cases by clarifying that it did not intend "to substitute
for the required finding that the employer's action was the
product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and

40. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(cX2) (1994).
41. Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 102, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994)).
42. One study found that plaintiffs were successful in employment discrimination
cases twice as often before juries as before judges. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1124, 1175 (1992).
43. See, e.g., EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 943 (4th Cir. 1992);
Aungst v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 937 F.2d 1216, 1221, 1223 (7th Cir. 1991).
44. See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992); Samuels
v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1991).
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much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable."'
The circuit courts have not totally agreed on the meaning of
Hicks, especially on the issue of whether evidence that is sufficient to prove that the employer's articulated justification is
pretextual is also always sufficient to warrant the finder of fact
to conclude that there was a discriminatory motive. Some have
asserted that although Hicks holds that evidence sufficient to
establish pretext does not compel a verdict for the plaintiff, it
also contemplates that proof of pretext would always permit
such a verdict.' Others have held that whether evidence sufficient to prove pretext is also sufficient to prove discrimination
should turn on the normal standards for directed verdicts in
civil cases. For these circuits, proof of pretext will be sufficient
in some cases, but in other cases, where the evidence suggests
other possible nondiscriminatory motives, plaintiffs will have to
present additional direct proof of discriminatory motive to permit a positive verdict from the factfinder. '
Regardless of how this split in the circuits is resolved, however, it now seems clear that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
methodology does not significantly facilitate proof of covert
discriminatory motive. If adequate proof of pretext does not
ensure that a plaintiff's case will be decided by a jury, it is
hard to see how plaintiffs are assisted at all by the methodology. Establishing a prima facie case does force the defendant to
articulate a justification, or justifications, upon which the plaintiff can focus his or her challenge. However, plaintiffs generally
should be able to induce such an articulation through pretrial
discovery in any event. Even if proof that is adequate to establish pretext ensures that a jury can find that discriminatory
motive existed, plaintiffs are unlikely to benefit in many ADEA
cases, as long as judges demand strong evidence of pretext

45. 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993).
46. See, e.g., Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330-31 (3d Cir.
1995); Sirvidas v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 60 F.3d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1995); Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1995).
47. See, e.g., Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 441
(11th Cir. 1996); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th
Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996); Woods v.
Friction Materials, 30 F.3d 255, 260 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994).
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before allowing cases to be decided by juries that they may feel
are overly sympathetic to older workers."
Indeed, it may be that plaintiffs are actually sometimes impeded by the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine system. Some lower
court decisions have added significant weight to a plaintiffs
light McDonnell Douglas burden of proving a prima facie case.
For instance, the Fourth Circuit has held that in reduction-inforce cases where the employer claims that relative performance
was the standard for selecting those to be terminated, to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must prove both that he
was performing at a level substantially equivalent to the lowest
level of those retained, and that the process of selection produced a retained work force with some persons outside
plaintiff's protected class who were performing at a level lower
than that at which the plaintiff was performing.4 9 Clearly, the
challenge of proving covert motivation is aggravated, rather
than alleviated, if plaintiffs must clear significant hurdles such
as these before they can offer proof that an employer's justification is pretextual as relevant to their ultimate burden of proving discriminatory motivation. 0
Even more important to the ADEA's relative impotency
against covert discrimination has been the interpretation of the
Act to require ADEA plaintiffs to prove not only that a covert
discriminatory motive existed, but also that the motive was a

48. See, e.g., Bergan v. Standard Duplicating Mach., 1996 WL 422876, at *2 (9th
Cir. 1996) (evidence insufficient to show pretext and survive motion for summary
judgment).
49. See Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1993); Duke v.
Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1418 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 963 (1991). As
this example suggests, the courts often anticipate an employer's justifications in formulating prima facie case requirements.
50. From an exhaustive study of Title VII and ADEA cases, Professor Malamud
indeed concludes that "to the extent that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine does shape decision-making, its effects are often detrimental to plaintiffs-the very people it supposedly helps--because McDonnell Douglas-Burdine renders courts less able to recognize
forms of discrimination that do not straightforwardly match the proof structure's
template." Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks,
93 MCH. L. REv. 2229, 2279-80 (1995). Professor Malamud acknowledges, however,
that many lower courts in fact try to avoid the restrictions of the McDonnell DouglasBurdine system for plaintiffs by considering evidence of pretext as relevant to the
prima facie case and by avoiding grants of summary judgment, on the basis of inadequacies in the prima facie case, without consideration of pretext evidence. See id. at
2289-90, 2298-2301.
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"but for" cause of the adverse personnel action being challenged. This interpretation derives from reactions to the Supreme Court's 1989 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins5 decision. In
cases predating Price Waterhouse, most circuit courts, though
differing in how proof burdens should be distributed, had held
that employers do not violate the employment discrimination
laws by making a personnel decision while considering some
proscribed factor such as race or age unless the decision actually would have been different but for consideration of the proscribed factor.52 In Price Waterhouse, a Title VII sex discrimination case, the Court resolved the circuits' split on the allocation of proof burdens by holding that if a plaintiff proves that
the illegitimate factor was a "substantial factor" in an adverse
employment decision,53 the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that it would have come to the same
decision in the absence of the illegitimate consideration. However, the Court confirmed that a defendant who carries this burden can avoid a finding of a violation of Title VII. 4
Congress rejected this holding of Price Waterhouse by passing
section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' This section adds
a provision to Title VII which states that "an unlawful employment practice is established" when the plaintiff proves that an
illegitimate factor was a "motivating factor for any employment

51. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

52. As reported by the Price Waterhouse Court, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits had required plaintiffs to prove that the decision would have been
different but for consideration of the prohibited factor, while the First, Second, Sixth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits had required defendants to prove that their decision
would not have been different but for consideration of the prohibited factor whenever
plaintiffs prove that the factor was "substantial" or "motivating." See id. at 238 n.2.

Only the Eighth and Ninth Circuits had held that the discrimination laws can be violated regardless of proof of determinative causation, and even these circuits had held
that an employer could avoid most significant remedial relief by proving that the factor did not determine its ultimate decision. See id.
53. The "substantial factor" standard was asserted in separate concurring opinions
filed by both Justice White and Justice O'Connor, one of whose votes was needed to
give the four Justice plurality a majority. See id. at 259, 265. The plurality opinion
had stated that the plaintiff only must prove that the illegitimate factor "played a
motivating part in an employment decision" in order to shift the burden of proof to
the defendant to establish the affirmative defense of a lack of "but for" causation. Id.
at 258.
54. See id.
55. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 (1994)).
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practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 6 Section 107 also amends the remedial provision of Title
VII, stating that a defendant can avoid certain remedies, including reinstatement, backpay, or damages, by proving that it
would have taken the same action "in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." ' When defendants are able to
make such proof, plaintiffs generally will only be able to obtain
declaratory relief, attorneys' fees, and costs."
Section 107, however, did not amend the ADEA, and since its
passage the circuit courts have continued to hold that the
ADEA is only violated when an adverse employment decision
has been caused or determined by consideration of age. 9 The
circuits are supported in these holdings by language in the
Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins,"e stating that an ADEA disparate treatment claim
cannot succeed unless age "had a determinative influence on
the outcome."' Indeed, some circuits may require ADEA plain56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX2XB) (1994).
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Mills v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 83 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir.
1996); Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir. 1995); Cooley v.
Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1333 (6th Cir. 1994).
The applicability of section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to ADEA cases,
however, seems not to have been addressed directly by the circuit courts. For potentially influential dicta, see Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 1002-03 (5th
Cir. 1996) (DeMoss, J., concurring and dissenting); and Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47
F.3d 586, 598-99 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1995). But cf. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Corp., 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1996) (using section 107 to inform court on
ADEA after-acquired-evidence issue).
60. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
61. Id. at 610. A case might be made that the ADEA doctrine fashioned by the
federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court, should be influenced by section 107.
Section 107 can be read as the most recent expression of how Congress wants discrimination proof approached. The fact that it does not mention the ADEA can be
explained by the fact that it was a direct reaction .to Price Waterhouse, a Title VII
case. It understandably might not have been clear to Congress that ADEA courts
would find Price Waterhouse controlling. Furthermore, there is no clear legislative
history indicating that Congress intended that the two similar laws contain different
proof standards. See generally Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't
Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1158-72 (1993).
However, as Professor Eglit argues, the Congress that passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 demonstrated that it could amend all civil rights statutes simultaneously,
as evidenced by its response to another 1989 Supreme Court Title VII decision, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), in section 108 of the 1991 Act. See id. at 1192-93.
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tiffs to prove "but for" causation without even the benefit of the
burden shifting presumption established in Price Waterhouse.62
In these circuits, plaintiffs must establish that age was a determinative cause of an adverse decision either through the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine system or by direct proof of covert
discriminatory motive. Even in those circuits that have held
that Price Waterhouse does apply to ADEA cases,6 defendants
can avoid not only ADEA compensatory remedies, but also any
finding of liability, declaratory orders, and attorney fees, by
demonstrating that they would have made the same decision in
the absence of a discriminatory motive.
Furthermore, Price Waterhouse burden shifting has proven to
be of limited utility for either ADEA or Title VII plaintiffs hoping to prove covert discriminatory motivation. The lower courts
have insisted that it only be applied in the rare cases where an
employer has been foolish enough to allow a covert, illegitimate
motive to surface. Courts have done so by holding that plaintiffs must offer what the courts call "direct" proof of discrimination to obtain the benefit of Price Waterhouse burden shifting.6' These holdings rely on language in Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse.' Justice O'Connor asserted that "in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue
of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff
must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was
a substantial factor in the decision."' Justice O'Connor's opinion has been accepted as controlling even though neither the
four-justice plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse nor Justice
White's separate concurring opinion indicated agreement that
only "direct" evidence of discriminatory intent could justify
shifting the burden of proof on causation to a defendant.67
This Congress also dearly was aware of the particular independent existence of the
ADEA, as evidenced by its amendment of ADEA limitations periods in section 115 of
the 1991 Act. Congress's failure to mention the ADEA in section 107 thus cannot be

easily dismissed.
62. See, e.g., Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 82 F.3d 533, 536
(1st Cir. 1996); Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir. 1995).

63. See, e.g., Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415, 418-19 (8th Cir.
1996); Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 588 (3d Cir. 1995); Cronin v. Aetna Life

Ins., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1995).
64. See infra notes 68 and 69.
65. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

67. At least one circuit court decision has expressed doubt that Justice O'Connor's
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The circuits have had difficulty determining what Justice
O'Connor meant by "direct" evidence. Some courts profess to
require plaintiffs to utilize only evidence that can be called
"direct" rather than "circumstantial" under the traditional distinction of evidence that does not require inferential deductions
from evidence that does require such inferences."
This distinction, however, cannot explain Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Price Waterhouse, because the evidence in that
case did require inferences that the sex-conscious attitudes
toward the plaintiff, expressed by some of the decision-makers,
influenced their decisions not to offer the plaintiff a partnership
in their firm. Furthermore, even the circuits that profess to
draw this evidentiary line do not seem fully to adhere to it.
They allow the consideration of some evidence that requires
inferences, but refuse to allow the consideration of other evidence.69
Other circuits profess to require that the evidence "directly
tie" or make a direct "causal connection" between the challenged decision and the discriminatory attitude." These circuits do not even pretend to reject all evidence requiring some
inferences, but instead attempt to determine whether the evi-

opinion should be controlling. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176,
1183-87 (2d Cir. 1992).
The application of Justice O'Connor's concurrence to Title VII cases after the
passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is especially troublesome, because neither section
107 of that Act nor its legislative history indicates that Congress intended to limit
the kind of proof plaintiffs can offer to demonstrate a statutory violation without also
proving pretext under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine methodology. Section 107 simply provides that it is sufficient for plaintiffs to establish one of the Title VII categories as "a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice." 42 USC § 2000(e)(2)(m) (1994). Yet circuit courts continue to uphold jury instructions that ask whether "race was a determinative factor"
in cases where plaintiff's evidence does not qualify under Justice O'Connor's "direct"
evidence standard. See, e.g., Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1144 (4th Cir. 1995).
68. See, e.g., Purrington v. University of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025, 1031-32 (10th cir.
1993); Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993);
Burns v. Gadsden State Community College, 908 F.2d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1990).
69. See, e.g., Brown, 989 F.2d at 861 (stating that the routine use of racial slurs
could be direct evidence that racial animus motivated employment decisions, although
acknowledging that the court had previously held that certain age-related comments
were too vague).
70. See, e.g., Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 1994); Radabaugh
v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1993); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut.
Ins., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992).
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dence reflects an attitude of a decision-maker about the particular decision concerning which discrimination is alleged. A good
example is the Fourth Circuit, which has explained that "what
is required ...

is evidence of conduct or statements that both

reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear
directly on the contested employment decision." 71 Though
somewhat more liberal than a strict circumstantial evidence
standard, this standard can still prevent plaintiffs from shifting
the burden of proof of causation to defendants through use of
probative circumstantial evidence, such as egregious employment statistics and frequent general age-stereotyping comments
from a decision-maker. 72
No circuit seems to have adopted the most coherent meaning
of Justice O'Connor's position, that direct evidence is evidence
that proves a discriminatory motive, rather than evidence that
proves the absence of a nondiscriminatory motive, as in a
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine pretext case. This definition would
permit consideration of statistical evidence and of evidence of
general bias in the decision-maker as probative of the consideration of age as a substantial motivating factor. But even it
would exclude, for purposes of burden shifting, consideration of
evidence that undermines the credibility of the defendant's
articulated legitimate motive, rather than directly proves the
existence of an illegitimate motive.7 3
71. Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995).
72. For instance, in Fuller, 67 F.3d at 1143, the court stated that "statistical
evidence by nature does not merit a mixed-motive charge" to a jury. In Robinson v.
Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 508 n.6 (2d Cir. 1994), the court stated
that evidence that an officer of the defendant stated that he wanted to replace older
workers with "young tigers" was indirect because it did not refer specifically to the

plaintiff.
73. As far as I can determine, no circuit now holds that plaintiff's proof that the
defendant's articulated legitimate motive is at least partially pretextual can support
burden shifting under Price Waterhouse. At least two circuits, however, at one time
held that any kind of proof might suffice. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958
F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1992); White v. Federal Express Corp., 939 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.
1991). See generally Michael A. Zubrensky, Despite the Smoke, There is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 346 STAN. L. REV. 959 (1994). In addition, the position of the Ninth Circuit as to the kinds of circumstantial evidence that can support burden shifting is not
clear at this point. Compare Board v. Children's Hosp., 1996 WL 540168, at *3 (9th
Cir. 1996) (finding no "direct" evidence to support mixed motive claim) with Lam v.
University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1566 (9th Cir. 1994) (considering the adequacy of
strong circumstantial evidence to support a mixed motive claim).
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The lower courts' embrace of Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse might have even worse implications
for ADEA plaintiffs. The lower courts might use this opinion to
hold that in those cases where the "direct" evidence standard
cannot be met (which probably includes the vast majority of
meritorious cases), plaintiffs must proceed under the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine methodology, and must prove the complete
absence of any nondiscriminatory motivation proffered by employers as a defense. They must, in other words, prove that age
was the sole, not just a determinative, cause of the challenged
action. This would find support in the original rationale for
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine which allowed proof of a discriminatory motive through proof of the absence of a nondiscriminatory motive. But it would mean that the pretext methodology of
proof would substantially aggravate, rather than help solve,
plaintiffs' problems in proving covert discriminatory motives. It
would require plaintiffs who use particular kinds of probative
circumstantial evidence to prove a more complete causal connection than required by Congress or even by the Supreme
Court.
Although there is good reason to think that the law will not
develop to be this restrictive for ADEA plaintiffs, as Hicks,
Price Waterhouse, and Hazen Paper are blended by the lower
courts,74 it is also clear that these cases, and their lower court
applications, do not assist plaintiffs in proving covert discriminatory motive. Given the state of proof doctrine under the
ADEA, an employer should feel confident that it can insulate
itself from proof that its agents took age into account making
an employment decision, by constructing a plausible pretext
that cannot be completely disproved, and by taking care that its
decision-making agents do not comment directly on the age of
the adversely affected employee. If employer agents take care
not to provide direct evidence of discriminatory intent, plaintiffs
will have to prove that the agents would not have made the
74. In a thorough and well-reasoned decision directly confronting the issue, the
Third Circuit held that ADEA plaintiffs who do not qualify for a Price Waterhouse
burden shifting instruction, and who thus attempt to prove pretext under McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine, must only prove that age was a determinative factor, rather than
the sole cause of a challenged decision. See Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 59899 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). Miller is likely to be influential. See, e.g., Fuller, 67 F.3d
at 1137, 1143 n.3 (citing Miller).
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same decision based on some plausible pretext. Judges, skeptical of the existence of age discrimination and the policies
underlying the ADEA, will be able to reject jury verdicts, based
on their conclusions that "but for" causation has not been established.
It would be difficult to do direct empirical research to support
my claim that the ADEA as interpreted cannot effectively control covert age discrimination. However, the statistics that we
do have on the nature of employment discrimination litigation
provide some support for this thesis. Professor Eglit's study of
1996 ADEA litigation reported in this Symposium, as well as
the unpublished 1968-1986 study that he describes, indicate
that more than two out of three ADEA cases have involved
challenges to discharges. 5 This is several times the percentage
of cases involving challenges for failure to hire. For instance,
only 18 of the 222 federal district court rulings on ADEA
claims in 1996, or less than 8%, addressed refusals to hire,
while 158 of the 222,
or 71%, concerned a challenge to some
76
kind of termination.
These are not the kind of statistics we would expect if older
workers could anticipate being successful in uncovering a high
proportion of instances of covert discrimination. For the reasons
explained above,7 7 the economic incentives to consider the age
of relatively unknown workers when making hiring decisions
are more pervasive than those to consider the age of incumbent
workers when making termination decisions. Economic theory,
consistent with the findings of the Wirtz Report,78 predicts
that there is much more age-based decision-making at hiring
than at discharge.
On the other hand, these statistics can be explained as reflecting the greater likelihood that incumbent workers will have
access to some evidence of covert age discrimination. Incumbent
workers have been given past reports on their performance,

75. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty:
Where It's Been, Where It is Today, Where It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 623-30
(1997).
76. See id. at 628.
77. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
78. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
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they know something of how co-workers have been treated and
of their employer's general personnel policies, and they may
even have friends within the firm to assist them in the collection of information. To the extent that covert discrimination is
especially difficult to prove, we would expect these factors to be
more important and more termination cases to be brought. In
this light, it is also interesting that studies of trends in general
employment discrimination reveal an increasing percentage of
discharge cases relative to hiring cases, as overt, formal policies
against the employment of blacks and women, as well as older
workers, have been eliminated.7"
My view of the employment discrimination litigation statistics
which we have before us, thus, comports with my analysis of
the worth of employment discrimination litigation doctrine for
ADEA plaintiffs: The ADEA, as currently interpreted, does not
provide an effective tool for the extirpation of covert consideration of age in employment decision-making. If this view is
correct, it does not necessarily mean that the ADEA has been
incorrectly interpreted, or even that it expresses flawed policy
judgments. Our society rationally might not wish to pay the
price of a statute that effectively addresses a form of covert
discrimination that is often economically efficient for its perpetrators. We may want to allow employers to consider age in
some limited number of cases, as long as they do not implement blanket, formal policies against the employment of all
older workers. We may also want to avoid inducing employers
to retain unproductive older workers whose lack of productivity
cannot be easily established in litigation. However, we should
be realistic about what we can accomplish under current doctrine, and should not allow ourselves to be deluded into think79. See John J. Donohue II & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985 n.3, 1015-16 (1991) (presenting data on charges filed with the EEOC and on an American Bar Foundation
litigation survey). Donohue and Siegelman do not provide any convincing explanation
of this trend beyond their stress on the elimination of formal, blanket exclusions of
women and minorities from certain more desirable jobs.
One plausible alternative explanation of the higher percentage of termination
than hiring claims is the tendency of people to value more highly that which they
have than that which they might obtain. Cf. Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979
WIS. L. REV. 769. Thus, a worker might feel more deprived by the loss of a particular job than he would feel deprived by his failure to obtain the same job. This would
not explain any trend toward proportionately more termination litigation, however.
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ing that we have accomplished even the Wirtz Report's modest
goal of eliminating the use of age-based generalizations in employment decision-making, let alone its more fimdamental goals
of reducing the unemployment, underemployment, and loss of
dignity of older workers.
Ill. ELIMINATING THE BARRIER OF WAGE EXPECTATIONS
In fact, the fundamental goals of the Wirtz Report cannot be
reached even by an ADEA strengthened to ease plaintiffs' proof
burdens if the Act does not also eliminate as a justification for
not hiring or retaining an older worker the higher labor costs of
that worker under the employer's express or implied wage
structure. As noted above, the Wirtz Report recognized that
certain pervasive "institutional arrangements" designed to protect incumbent older workers often operate to discourage their
hiring and retention.0 The Report focused on benefit plans
that become more expensive for an employer with an aging
workforce and on seniority practices, such as promotion from
within and departmental limitations, that restrict the ability of
older workers to make career moves between employers or even
departments. The effect of benefit plans was addressed by the
Act as originally passed,8 ' and after the Act was misinterpreted by the Supreme Court," was readdressed by the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). The OWBPA made
clear that Congress intended to remove disincentives to the
hiring of older workers by only requiring employers to spend an
equal amount on the benefit plans of older employees, rather
than
requiring employers to spend more to offer the same beneat
fit.

80.

WIRTZ

REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-17.

81. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1994).
82. See Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
83. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, 981 (1990).
84. Section 103 of the OWBPA amended section 4 of the ADEA to clarify that it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice "to observe the terms of a bona fide
employee benefit plan where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount
of payment made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than that
made or incurred on behalf of a younger worker .
." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i)
(1994).
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But the ADEA cases have revealed that a related "institutional arrangement" that pervades American labor markets may
play an even larger role in the unemployment and underemployment of older workers. The Wirtz Report acknowledged this
factor without recognizing its importance when it noted that
some employers refuse to hire older workers because of their
higher wages. 5 Empirical evidence confirms that internal labor
markets typically include wage curves that rise with age or at
least with the closely related factor of experience.' Rising
wages and the expectations of rising wages of course provide
incentives for employers not to hire and to terminate older
workers to the extent that the wage increase is not justified by
an increase in productivity. Both the ADEA cases and empirical
evidence suggest that much of the wage increase associated
with age cannot be explained by rising productivity.' This
presents the question of why employers would implement pay
scales that offer higher wages as age and experience increase
without tying the increases to demonstrations of increased productivity.
One explanation is that employers pay higher wages to senior
workers, relative to their productivity, as an incentive for workers to stay on the job, to work harder while they do so, and to
be willing to acquire firm-specific skills that may not be fully
transferable to other employers. Employers promise employees a
total wage package over the course of the employees' careers
that roughly reflects the employees' expected total productivity;
but the employers promise that proportionately more wages will
be paid late in the employees' careers to provide the desired
incentives."

85. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
86. The evidence is gathered in an important recent article by Professor Christine
Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 TEX L. REV.
1813, 1818-21 (1996) [hereinafter Hands-Tying]. In this section of my essay I rely
heavily on some of Professor Jols' economic analysis. I do not, however, agree with
all her conclusions. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
87. See id. at 1820-21. The key studies are James L. Medoff & Katherine G.
Abraham, Are Those Paid More Really More Productive? The Case of Experience, 16 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 186, 204 (1981), and James L. Medoff & Katherine G. Abraham,
Experience, Performance, and Earnings, 95 Q.J. ECON. 703 (1980).
88. See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchens, A Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment
Contracts, 5 J. LAB. ECON. S153 (1987); Robert M. Hutchens, Do Job Opportunities
Decline with Age?, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 89 (1988); Edward P. Lazear, Agency,
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Why would workers accept such promises? The traditional
economic explanation is that an employer can pay a larger total
wage package to employees because of the surplus generated by
the proper incentives contained in the rising wage curve. Under
this theory, employers induce employees to accept backloaded
wages by sharing the surplus that such wages generate.89 Another explanation is that workers are attracted to a rising wage
curve because of the documented apparent psychological preference in at least our culture for increased economic well being
and earnings over time. 0 My guess is that American workers
want the dignity that comes with the confirmation that their
prior experience has made them more valuable to society.
However, the rising wage promise may create two interrelated incentives that could generate unnecessary unemployment
and underemployment of older American workers. First, employers have a strong incentive to breach their commitments to
pay wages above marginal productivity late in employees' careers. Having reaped the benefits of the backloaded wage promise when the employees were young, employers can escape some
of the pay back by discharging older workers.
Of course, discharging older workers who earn high wages
can undermine an employer's credibility and reputation with
younger workers, thus making it more difficult for the employer
to induce the younger workers to work below their marginal
revenue product wage." However, the threat of reputation loss
is unlikely to provide an adequate incentive for employer opportunism of this sort. First, American business is now in an almost constant state of flux, expansion, and retrenchment. During a retrenchment period, an employer need not worry much
about its reputation with younger workers because it is not

EarningsProfles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 606 (1981);
Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POi. ECON. 1261

(1979).
89. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913, 1923 (1996).
90. See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Nachum Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage Profiles?, 9 J. LAB. EcoN. 67, 77-80 (1989). This explanation is pressed
by Professor Jolls. See Hands-Tying, supra note 86, at 1826-28.
91. This point has been made repeatedly in the literature. See, e.g., H. Lome
Carmichael, Reputation in the Labor Market, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 713 (184).
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hiring and cares little if a portion of its workforce departs.
Many, if not most, employers can save their opportunism for
these periods of retrenchment.92
Second, employers can make their promises of rising wages
credible by keeping only a fraction of their older workforce.
Younger employees will be sensitive to whether the older workers present are making the promised higher wages, but they
probably are not sensitive to the older workers who are out of
sight and out of mind because they are no longer employed.
Furthermore, given the documented tendency of most humans
to underestimate the probability that they will be the victims of
misfortune," some selected terminations of older workers are
not likely to convince younger workers that the promises of
rising wages made to them will not be kept.
Employees theoretically could address the potential for employer opportunistic breach of backloaded or rising wage promises by securing enforceable contractual promises for job security and higher late career wages. However, employees may
lack sufficient information and insight to understand why such
promises would be worth demanding.94 Moreover, as Walter
Kamiat has recently argued, any job applicants who did demand such promises would mark themselves as potential
"shirkers," "lemon" employees that employers would want to
avoid.95 In any event, a system to protect job security is a collective good that employees can only efficiently secure collectively. It is revealing that where employees do bargain collectively
in unions, they almost invariably do secure job security protection.'

92. Professor Jolls makes a similar point in a more elegant fashion using game
theory principles. See Hands-Tying, supra note 86, at 1836-37.
93. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 77 & n.53 (1990);
Steven L. Wilborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REv. 101, 128 n.88 (1988).
94. See Wilborn, supra note 93, at 127-32.
95. See Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor
Market and the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953,
1958-59 (1996).
96. Some have argued that the prevalence of job security protections in collective
agreements and the infrequent inclusion of such protections in individual employment
contracts instead suggest that only employees who want such protections choose to be
represented by unions. See generally, Rock and Wachter, supra note 89. However,
employees may reject union representation for a variety of other reasons, including
concerns that choosing a union will provoke employer retaliation, strikes, or other
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The rising wage curve creates for employers another incentive
that also must generate a great deal of unnecessary unemployment and underemployment of older workers. This second incentive is the incentive not to hire workers who have voluntarily or involuntarily left other jobs where they have built up
expectations of having higher wages later in their career. The
older the worker seeking employment, the less likely that the
employer can reap benefits by paying below marginal productivity, and the more likely that the employer will have to pay
above marginal productivity to meet expectations and to compensate for deflated early career wages.
In order to counter these strong disincentives to the employment of older workers, an anti-discrimination law must not
allow an employer to use its own rising wage scale as a justification for terminating or for refusing to hire an older worker.
However, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins," the Supreme Court
seemed to reject a line of lower court decisions that interpreted
the ADEA to have this effect.9" Hazen Paper held that the
ADEA condemns only age-based employment decision-making,
but not decision-making on the basis of other factors, such as
proximity to pension entitlement (at issue there) or presumably
higher wages, that may be associated with age, at least without
a showing that such decision-making has a disparate impact

pressure for wage increases that will cause the elimination of jobs. Indeed, a recent
major survey of workers' attitudes found that a majority of workers in non-union
companies believe that management opposition is the primary factor blocking unions
where they work. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WORKER REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION SURVEY: WAVE Two, REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 35 (1995).
Moreover, whatever the primary causes of union decline in the United States,
it seems clear that the National Labor Relations Act does not effectively deter
employers' union avoidance tactics, including retaliation against union supporters. See,
e.g., Michael C. Harper, The Case for Limiting Judicial Review of Labor Board Certification Decisions, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262 (1987); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep:
Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1769 (1983). In addition, union protection is not a legally protected option for many
employees who can claim protection under the ADEA, including managers and supervisors. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
97. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
98. See, e.g., Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929
F.2d 814, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1991) (dictum); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867,
875 (6th Cir. 1990) (dictum); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir.
1987); Wolf v. Ferro Corp., 772 F. Supp. 139, 142 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Whitten v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1522, 1537 (D. Kan. 1991).
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against older workers that does not have a compelling business
justification."
The Hazen Paper Court's reservation of the issue of whether
the ADEA can be used to attack employment policies that
disproportionately disadvantage older workers without proof of
discriminatory intent might seem to offer ADEA plaintiffs hope
that they can still challenge the application of experience-based
wage curves against them. In another pre-Hazen line of decisions, some circuit courts had approved ADEA disparate impact
challenges to criteria such as years of experience,0 0 retirement eligibility, 1 ' and tenure, 02 that employers wished to
use to reduce their labor costs. ADEA plaintiffs should not have
great difficulty in most cases establishing that older workers
are disproportionately affected by an employer's use of higher
salaries associated with experience or seniority as a reason not
to hire or to discharge.0 3
ADEA plaintiffs, however, would be foolish to be optimistic
about the use of the Title VII-developed disparate impact methodology against employers' salary-based defenses. In a concurring opinion for three Justices in Hazen Paper,Justice Kennedy
asserted that "there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to
the ADEA.""' Those arguments, including the inclusion of a
"reasonable factors other than age" defense in the ADEA0 5
and the failure of Congress to mention the ADEA when confirming the availability of disparate impact proof for Title VII
in section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,"° were forcefully advanced in a thorough post-Hazen opinion of the Tenth

99. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611-12.
100. See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1980).
101. See EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984).
102. See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983).
103. See Geller, 635 F.2d at 1027.
104. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Markham v.
Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 946-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
Court's denial of certiorari).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994); cf County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S.
161, 170 (1981) (suggesting that incorporation of a "factors other than sex" defense
into Title VII for sex-based wage discrimination cases may preclude disparate impact
proof).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(k) (1994). See generally, Eglit, supra note 61, at 1179-91.
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Circuit that may provide a template for a later Supreme Court
resolution of the issue."7

More importantly, even if the disparate impact methodology
of proof remains available, it is not sufficient to counter labor
cost justifications for personnel decisions disfavoring older workers. There is no better business justification than the reduction

of costs. Reducing labor costs for each unit an employee produces can be achieved either by hiring more productive employees

or by hiring employees of the same productivity at lower wages.
The two strategies are simply opposite sides of the same coin.
The Supreme Court has never suggested that labor cost justifi-

cations do not provide defenses to disparate impact claims.0 5

Plaintiffs might argue that an employer should not be able to
apply general policies against the employment of more experienced workers who could command more on the employer's
wage scale, and that instead, employers should be required to
give individual assessments to all workers to determine whether their particular experience enhances their productivity
enough to justify a higher wage. However, even in the unlikely
event that this argument persuades the Supreme Court to dis-

allow a cost defense in at least certain types of ADEA disparate
impact claims, it would not assist plaintiffs in cases like Metz
v. Transit Mix, Inc.,' where the employer does give individual assessment to a more expensive older worker and decides
that he is not worth the higher wage level to which he has

progressed.

107. See Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2500 (1996). Thus far, however, the Ellis decision has not swept the circuits. See, e.g.,
Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1469-70 (8th Cir. 1996); Koger v. Reno,
98 F.3d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
108. In contrast, the Court pronounced in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 210 (1991), that the extra cost of employing members of a Title VII protected
class does not provide a defense for intentional discrimination. When a finding of
discrimination must depend on negative effects, rather than intent, positive effects
such as cost savings must also be considered. Therefore, the EEOC regulation relied
upon in Geller, found at 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979), is inapplicable because it only
rejects cost as a justification for classification formally based on age, rather than on
criteria, such as salary, that are correlated with age.
109. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987). The court in Metz, however, held that salary
savings realized by replacing an older employee with a younger employee were not a
permissible nondiscriminating justification for terminating the older employee. See id.
at 1207.
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Plaintiffs might also argue under the disparate impact methodology that employers should be forced to implement the less
drastic alternative of offering lower wages before refusing to
hire or firing someone because their experience would otherwise
command higher wages on the employer's pay scale."0 However, employers have a good reason for not offering reduced wages: an employee who has earned higher wages or who has reasonable expectations of earning higher wages because of his
experience will not be satisfied with lower wages and therefore
will present a morale problem for the workforce. This reason
should probably suffice as a business justification in disparate
impact cases and as a demonstration in an individual disparate
treatment case that the cost defense is not a pretextual reason
for not hiring an older worker. In fact, employers probably do
not want to continue to employ more experienced workers earning reduced wages because such workers belie the promises of
rising wages given to younger workers. But this is just another
way of explaining why reducing the wages of the older worker
will engender morale problems.
In sum, whether or not Hazen Paper adumbrates the demise
of ADEA disparate impact cases, it seems clear that the ADEA
as now interpreted cannot protect older workers from the loss
of employment opportunities caused by the rising wage curves
that characterize many employers' internal labor markets."'
In my view, given the importance of this "institutional arrangement" to the unemployment and underemployment of older
workers, the ADEA must be considered inadequate, for this
reason as well, when judged against the ultimate goals of the
Wirtz Report.

110. See Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d
814, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1991); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 876 (6th Cir.
1990).
111. Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that these curves are most likely
to be present for jobs involving tasks that are difficult for employers to monitor, and
thus encourage employers to provide special inducements to employees to work harder. See Robert M. Hutchens, A Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts,
5 J. LAB. ECON. S153, S161, S163 (1987).
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IV. A MORE EFFECTIVE ADEA?
It is not difficult to suggest practical modifications to the
ADEA that would address the two deficiencies that I have highlighted above. First, to eliminate the primary institutional barrier to the full employment of older workers, Congress could in
part overrule Hazen Paper to provide that an employer cannot
use the wage of an incumbent worker within the ADEA protected class as a justification for the discharge, constructive discharge, or demotion of that worker. The law also would have to
provide that an employer cannot refuse to hire an older worker
because that older worker has been earning more money in a
prior job or because the employer would have to pay the older
worker more under internal pay scales that promise higher
wages with experience."
There are strong grounds for prohibiting cost-based justifications for refusals to hire as well as for terminations. First, as a
number of law and economics scholars have highlighted, making it more difficult to discharge workers in a protected class
provides further incentives for employers not to hire such workers." Employers concerned that the law will not allow them
to terminate older workers because their wages have risen to
exceed their marginal productivity will be less inclined to hire
workers who are within or even close to the ADEA-protected
over-forty-year-old class. Thus, the law must vigorously enforce
hiring discrimination standards so that termination discrimination standards will not frustrate the kind of employment goals
that the Wirtz Report set for an age discrimination statute.

112. The law should require the kind of jury instructions sought by the EEOC, but
rejected by the Eighth Circuit, in EEOC v. Atlantic Community School District, 879
F.2d 434, 435 (8th Cir. 1989):
It is illegal under federal law for an employer to discriminate
against older workers because they are higher in the employer's pay
scale as a result of their years of experience. If you find that the salary
level Mrs. Parks would have been eligible for because of her years of
experience was a determining factor in defendant's decision not to hire
her, you should find for the plaintiff.
113. See generally, Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring:
Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX L. REV. 1487
(1996); Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 79.
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Second, as Professor Jolls argues, prohibiting cost-justifications for refusals to hire, as well as for terminations of older
workers, enables an age discrimination law to mimic the kind
of contracts that many workers, would like to form with multiple employers, contracts that promise rising wages with increased experience, regardless of which employer in an industry
takes advantage of that experience." In Jolls' view, such contracts would be efficient since they would enable employees and
employers to make the commitment to exchange lower early
career wages for higher late career wages more meaningful,
because the commitment could not be broken by the voluntary
or involuntary loss of jobs with early career employers. This
would benefit employers because it would enable them to more
readily use the promise of late career wages as an inducement
for hard early career work. The law may have to intervene,
Jolls argues, because interemployer contracting is not practical.
Jolls' efficient market mimicking analysis is somewhat
vulnerable to challenge. One of the reasons employers may offer
rising wage promises, in addition to the encouragement of hard
early career effort, is to discourage turnover. Obviously this
employer goal would not be served by interemployer commitments to pay rising wages. Furthermore, Jolls' emphasis on
achieving the efficiency of a perfect labor market leads her to
suggest that employers should be committed not only to hire
new older workers without using cost-based defenses, but also
to hire them at the higher wages that were promised them by
former employers."' Thus, she suggests that courts might
have to look to other firms or even to other industries to set
"age-wage benchmarks."" 6 This judicial control of employer
pay scales does not seem more practical here than it would be
for any attempt to achieve the goals of comparable worth
theory.
However, to avoid the forced unemployment and underemployment of older workers, the law would not have to prohibit
employers from reducing the wages of incumbent older workers
to the level earned by comparably productive younger workers

114. See Hands-Tying, supra note 86, at 1830-39.
115. See id. at 1837-38.
116. Id. at 1843.
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in comparable positions. As explained above," 7 employers who
have promised rising wages normally will not want to suffer
the impact on employee morale that would be produced by
breaking that promise for workers who remain employed. When
an employer is willing to significantly cut an older worker's
wages, it usually will have good reason for doing so. In any
event, the goals of an age diseimination statute do not require
the government to oversee employee wages so long as older
workers are not treated more poorly than comparable younger
workers.
Similarly, an employer should be able to offer older applicants for employment the lower wages paid younger, less experienced workers in comparable positions, if the employer is
willing to bear the costs to the integrity of its internal labor
market and to the promises of rising wages that it makes in
that market. Employers simply should not be able to use the
dilemma between paying more for an older worker and suffering reputational costs as an excuse for not hiring the older
worker.
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that if employers are not restrained in setting the wages of new, as well as
incumbent, older workers when wages are at least as high
relative to productivity as the wages of younger workers, a
prohibition on the use of a cost-based defense to refusing to
hire will probably result in a decline in the rising wages offered
to more experienced workers by most employers. The reason is
that employers who offer a higher wage premium to more experienced workers would be flooded with applications from such
workers. Employers might address this phenomenon by not
offering above marginal productivity wages to workers with
experience gained with other employers or by flattening the
incline on their age-wage curve. Since there would still be incentives to offer some age or experience premium, it is difficult
to predict where an equilibrium age-wage incline would be set
for any group of employers, but it seems clear that the equilibrium that results from legal regulation would not be identical
to that set by a perfectly working market.

117. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, if the Wirtz Report's goals of enhanced human
dignity and fuller use of human resources through the encouragement of the full employment of older workers are stressed,
rather than merely mimicking "perfect" labor markets, we can
conclude that we should prohibit the use of high labor costs as
a justification for the refusal to hire, as well as for the termination of, older workers. To the extent that our goals are ones of
fuller employment, we need not be concerned about any incentives on employers to qualify their promises of higher wages for
older and more experienced workers, just as we are not concerned that the OWBPA now makes clear that employers do
not have to offer the same health insurance benefits to older
workers, as long as they do not use the cost of health insurance
as a justification for not employing these workers."'
The elimination of most covert age discrimination in employment could also be made feasible through a few modifications
to the ADEA. Most clearly, employment discrimination plaintiffs
should be able to establish liability under the ADEA the same
way that Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 permits
plaintiffs to establish liability under Title VII, by proving that a
protected status was considered in an employment decision,
without also having to prove that the consideration was a butfor cause of that decision." Moreover, plaintiffs should be
free to use any probative evidence to prove the consideration of
protected status. The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and Price
Waterhouse proof methodologies should not be combined in a
2
way that constrains consideration of all a plaintiffs proof."
Congress could clarify that the "motivating factor" standard of
Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is available to all
ADEA, as well as Title VII, plaintiffs, regardless of the circumstantial or "indirect" nature of the proof that they offer. Such a
clarification would make meaningful a condemnation of all
consideration of protected status in employment decision-making, as well as significantly reduce the difficulty of proving
covert discrimination.

118. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
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Congress might also supplement the remedies made available
to ADEA (and Title VII) plaintiffs who establish that consideration of a protected status contributed to an adverse employment decision, even where the employer convinces the trier of
fact that it would have made the same decision without
consideration of the status. In order for the statute to effectively deter what might be an economically rational consideration
of age, these remedies should not be limited to declaratory orders and attorney's fees, as they are under current Title VII
law."' While remedies available after proof of contributing
cause need not include the ADEA's liquidated damages, reinstatement, or front pay, they should at least include back pay
for the period during which an employer continues to litigate
and deny liability.
Finally, Congress might validate the mandatory presumption
of indirect proof of discrimination based on proof of employer
pretext that plaintiffs' advocates thought they had achieved
through the McDonnell Douglas-Burdinemethodology before the
pretext-plus response of the lower courts and the Supreme
Court's Hicks decision.'
Such a mandatory presumption admittedly would bear the cost of many meritless discrimination
claims being found valid. As Justice Scalia explained for the
Court in Hicks, employers may want to hide even some nondiscriminatory motives and sometimes may not be able to isolate a
legal covert motivation.'
Furthermore, such a mandatory
presumption in favor of lawsuits brought by plaintiffs in at
least Title VII-protected classes could be attacked as affirmative
action and thus would be politically unpopular.'
On the other hand, most Americans might support defining
as illegal any employment decision against an older American
that the older American could prove was not explainable by any
justification offered by the employer. That support indeed might
be because of, rather than in spite of, the fact that such a
broad proscription, combined with a prohibition on the use of
higher labor costs as a justification for the termination or non-

121.
122.
123.
124.

See
See
See
See

supra note 57 and accompanying text.
supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1993).
Malamud, supra note 50, at 2314-15.
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hiring of an ADEA-protected worker, would transform the
ADEA into not only a federal wrongful termination statute for
older workers, but a wrongful failure to hire statute as well.
The modifications to the ADEA suggested here would cause
employers to make sure that older workers were not denied
new or continued employment without certainty that there was
good cause for such denial, other than the wages that are normally paid workers of greater experience.
It may be, however, that even if the statutory modifications
necessary to make the ADEA effective in achieving the goals of
the Wirtz Report were popular with the average voter, they
could not be enacted because of the resistance of American
business. That resistance could be expressed as opposition to a
radical expansion of federal regulation of the employment relationship. It would derive from age discrimination often being
economically rational for employers and from an appreciation of
the costs that effective measures to eliminate its more subtle
and covert forms would impose.
Perhaps to make the costs of these measures more palatable
to employers, their enactment could be combined with two other
amendments to the ADEA. The first would reinstate an age cap
on the ADEA-protected class. I believe that the age of seventytwo would be realistic. If employers knew that their commitment to older workers could be terminated by mandatory retirement at a reasonable age, their incentives not to hire older
workers would be substantially reduced. Furthermore, allowing
mandatory retirement at some reasonable age such as seventytwo would also provide greater incentives for employers to offer
higher wages with age and experience. Employers would know
that their commitment to pay wages above marginal productivity was temporally bounded. This would partially compensate for
any incentive not to offer increased wages with age that would
be created by prohibiting employers using higher wages as a
justification for keeping their workforce younger.
Second, f the ADEA were made sufficiently effective to serve
as a protection against all arbitrary treatment of older workers
by American employers, it reasonably could include a preemption provision that would preclude state law also providing
workers certain additional protections from arbitrary discharge.
Such a preemption provision should not preclude state anti-
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retaliation, whistleblowing, or other public policy actions, but it
could preclude a broader statute like that of Montana,' as
well as any other state common-law developments that would
protect workers from wrongful discharge in the absence of any
actual contractual commitment from employers. 6 My guess is
that most Americans would be fully satisfied protecting workers
in the ADEA-protected class from arbitrary discharge, knowing
that younger workers have better opportunities to secure retraining and new jobs.
These two provisions might at least sufficiently qualify employer resistance to the strengthening of the ADEA to make
such strengthening politically feasible. It may be that our society is ready to calculate that the increased labor costs that
inevitably would be imposed by the protection of older workers
from arbitrary treatment are outweighed by the benefits of an
age discrimination law identified by the Wirtz Report: the enhancement of dignity for older Americans, and the reduction of
the waste of human resources in the unwanted and avoidable
unemployment and underemployment of older workers.
In any event, it is clear to me that if we are to achieve the
goals set forth over thirty years ago in the Wirtz Report, we
must not be satisfied with current law. The economic incentives
for employers to avoid the hiring, promotion, and retention of
older workers are too great to expect achievement of these goals
through what now operates effectively as only a prohibition of
overt consideration of age, without appreciation of the economic
reality of the higher wages commanded by the more experienced.

125. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1995).
126. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (acknowledging an implied contract based on course of dealings and employer's personnel

manual).

